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The aim of this study is to investigate the incentive role of dierent
type of contract. The hypothesis to be tested is that the probability
of exerting eort is higher for temporary workers than for permanent
ones, using indicators known in literature (unpaid overtime hours and
absenteeism for illness and family reasons). Data are taken from Italian
Labour Force Survey. Preliminary results show that temporary workers
provide more eort only with regard to absence, but not with regard to
unpaid overtime work.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with determinants of labor eort and investigates the role
played by dierent contractual arrangements. The hypothesis to be tested is
that the probability of exerting eort is higher for temporary workers than for
permanent employees. The indicators used, which are well-known in literature,
are unpaid overtime and absence at work which are considered signals of worker
eort. It has been observed (Green and Mclntosh, 1998), that in theoretical
literature it is dicult to nd a denition of eort. In Eciency Wage mod-
els, eort is dened in relation to shirking (which is described as the provision
of "minimal eort"), depends positively on wages and could be an outcome of
this family of models. Eort can also be estimated from a production function
(Marchetti and Nucci, 2001)1. Since labor utilization is a characteristic of busi-
ness 
uctuations, it could depend both on a rm's decisions and on a worker's
behaviour. According to this view, worker eort represents the unobserved la-
bor utilization. Eort is a key element of worker behaviour but its denition
is essentially empirical and measures of it may vary depending on the scope
of the research. There is evidence that the characteristics of an employment
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1This paper pointed out that the elasticity of eort could decrease with a rise in hours
worked (due to the higher fatigue exerted by the worker).
1contract may aect worker eort. Firstly, there is evidence of a relationship be-
tween sick-pay regulations and worker eort, signalled by increased absenteeism:
Barmby et al.(1991) nd that a rm's sick-pay scheme works most eectively
on the duration of the absence, whereas Barmby (2002) nd a decline in ab-
senteeism after a reduction of sick-pay2 Besides, some studies pointed out an
increase in the number of absence among Italian and German employees after
the end of a probation period without job security3. Ichino and Riphahn (2004)
show that the number of days of absence per week doubles once employment
protection is granted. This literature shows that probationary periods may in-
duce self-selection of those workers with more ability because they have a higher
probability of obtaining a permanent contract. Firms view the initial xed-term
contacts as a "probationary" stage. Consequently, the temporary worker may
be inclined to act as (mimic) "a good worker" - exerting more eort than they
would have done in a situation with greater job security - in order to be taken
on with a permanent contract (Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001). Therefore, rms
may use temporary contracts as a screening mechanism, similarly to what hap-
pens, for example, in cases of contracts with Rank Order Tournaments (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981). A paper by Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) presents evi-
dence that temporary employees display higher levels of eort than permanent
workers having considered unpaid overtime hours and absenteeism for illness
and family reasons as eort indicators, taken from a Swiss Labor Force Survey.
Ghignoni (2008) utilizes similar indicators for the Italian example (paid and
unpaid overtime work), using European Community Household Panel (EHCP)
data to show that temporary workers exert more eort only if they perceive
a high probability of getting a permanent contract. A discussion on overtime
work and absenteeism as measures of worker eort is in Meyer and Wallette
(2007) while Amilon and Wallette (2009) consider dierent reasons for absence
(worker sickness and sickness of a dependent child) separately for men and
women. The aim of this work is to examine the determinants of worker eort
and the role played by the type of contract with a focus on workers in Italy. This
paper moves from the contributions of Engellandt and Riphan and of Ghignoni,
following an alternative methodological approach: in order to isolate a causal
eect of the type of contract on worker eort, in this analysis propensity score
matching techniques are used to compare the eort (outcome) of people who
acquired a temporary job with those of people who started, in the same period,
a permanent job. A longitudinal dataset is required to exploit information in
the sample to come out with a matching strategy that controls for labor market
characteristics of the individual before the current temporary contract (as sug-
gested in Paggiaro et al., 2009). The Italian Labor Force Survey (Rilevazione
Continua delle Forze di Lavoro, LFS) has a "rotating panel" structure in which
every individual is interviewed for two subsequent quarters and then after one
year. In this paper a two year panel is created by pooling a series of subsequent
short panels that are made up of a great number of control variables describing
2See also Johansson and Palme (2002).
3see also Riphan and Thalmaier (2001), Ichino and Riphan (2001).
2socio-economic characteristics of the individual and the household. The next
section will provide a very brief background on temporary work in Italy and on
the principal characteristics of temporary workers in Italy. This representation
will allow for the start of the debate on the empirical strategy and the esti-
mates. Section 3 deals with the data, describes the indicators and the empirical
strategy, while section 4 and 5 present the result.
2 Temporary work in Italy
The Italian labor market is often described as deeply segmented between an
insider and an outsider market. As other European countries, Italy is charac-
terized by "
exibility at the margin", which combines a high degree of employ-
ment protection in the regular segment (with a strict ring regulation applying
to permanent workers), with a relatively high degree of 
exibility in the use
of temporary contracts. This situation is due to the way 
exibility has been
introduced in the country since 1990'4: Italy has removed legal obstacles hin-
dering the use of temporary work (xed term contracts, temporary agency work
and other forms of non-permanent work) while maintaining the same regula-
tions as in the past for permanent workers. Due to these institutional changes
the number of temporary workers greatly increased in the period from 1993 to
2008, prior to the subsequent recession. Moreover, as in other European coun-
tries, young people usually enter the labor market with a temporary contract.
Table 1 describes the share of temporary workers out of the total number of
employees. Temporary work is distributed very dierently among groups of
individuals with some categories being overrepresented. The share is actually
much higher for the younger workers up to the age of 35 and also for women.
Temporary contracts are also more important in the south of the country and
in the agricultural sector.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 The data
The data used in this study are taken from the Italian Labor Force Survey
(LFS), provided by ISTAT. The LFS provides, on a quarterly basis, a quite
rich dataset with many observations (about 200,000 individuals per wave) and
contains a wide set of control variables of personal information (gender, age,
education, marital status, among others) as well as of "work features" (e.g. the
type of contract, sector and occupation). Unfortunately, there is no measure of
job satisfaction (which could be related to eort), while salary was introduced
only in 2009. This analysis, however, covers the period between 2006-2007 prior
to the recession. This has been done due to the fact that more recent data
are presumably biased by cyclical eects: It is well-known that the impact on
4See Barbieri and Sestito (2008) for a contractual arrangement description.
3unemployment during the recession of 2008-2009 was diminished by a drop in the
number of average hours worked thanks to measures of internal 
exibility like
working time accounts and short time work. Consequently, the indicators used in
this work (overtime hours and absence) could be aected by a bias. Moreover,
the proportion of temporary and permanent workers was altered during this
economic downturn given that temporary employees are used by rms as a
"buer stock". In this work the "rotating panel" structure of the LFS was used,
exploiting the longitudinal feature of the survey: every individual is interviewed
for two subsequent quarters and then after one year. This makes for the building
of a two year panel composed of four dierent subsamples in which there are
three observations for every individual.
3.2 The outcome
To investigate the incentive role of temporary contracts (treatment), two indi-
cators, well known in literature, are used (Engellandt and Riphan, 2005). The
rst measures whether the worker has put in unpaid overtime hours while the
second describes whether the worker was absent at work (the entire week prior
to the survey). In LFS estimates, the unpaid overtime work indicator is taken
from two questions asked in the survey: rst the respondents are asked whether
in the week prior to the survey they have worked overtime hours. Next, the
respondent is asked if the overtime hours were remunerated. It is noteworthy
that in the LFS poll the questions relate to the week prior to the survey. The
second indicator describes if the worker was absent the entire week prior to the
survey. Both the eort indicators used are binary variables.
3.3 The treatment
In Italy there are many dierent schemes of temporary employment (xed-term
contracts, apprenticeship and other training-related schemes, temporary work
agency contracts), but empirically it is not possible to consider every type of
temporary contract as a specic treatment because of the small number of obser-
vations 5.The analysis is limited to what is known as "dependent employment"
(employees) 6 with the exclusion of the Armed Forces.
5The only sub-group which might be analyzed separately is xed-term contract (Paggiaro
et al., 2009).
6Paggiaro et al. (2009) note that "it is also possible to identify temporary contracts among
workers who are formally self-employed"(the so-called quasi subordinate workers - i.e. collab-
orazioni coordinate e continuative and collaborazioni occasionali. They exclude these workers
from the treatment group,"as preliminary analyses and backward tests showed that they are
quite dierent from the bulk of temporary employees in terms of past and future outcomes".
Here I made the same choice. However the number of "quasi subordinate" workers is quite
small.
43.4 The analysis
The hypothesis to test, as said, is whether workers with a temporary contract
exert more eort compared to those who are in permanent positions. First, a
descriptive analysis is conducted by regressing the eort outcomes on an indi-
cator of temporary employment and a set of control variables in a logit model
on cross section data. This is carried out on the employed and in order to test
the robustness of results, the model is estimated on the cross section along all
the available quarters of a year. Subsequently, to isolate a causal eect of the
type of contract on worker eort a propensity score matching technique is used.
The analysis is carried out on panel data from 2006-I to 2007-IV in which every
individual is observed three times. The main features of the evaluation strategy
are as follows: the reference population is the stock of individuals seeking work
at time T1 and successfully nd it (with a temporary or permanent contract)
between T1 and T2 ,the two alternative treatments are, as said, a temporary
and permanent job; the outcome is the eort measured observed at time T2.
The pre-treatment characteristics of individuals are collected at time T0. The
propensity score matching is implemented to compare those who enter in a tem-
porary job and those who enter in a permanent job between T1 and T2. The
identication strategy here is selection on observables. The propensity score
matching is based on pre treatment characteristics of individuals referred at
time T0 (age, geographical area, marital status, level of education, nationality,
labor market status at T0, student or not).
4 Cross section descriptive evidence
The estimation results for the unpaid overtime indicators are reported in tables
2 and 3 for all quarters of year 2007. The evidence shows that the unpaid
hours indicator (table 2) seems to be not in
uenced by the type of contract:
individuals in temporary jobs do not appear signicantly more likely to work
unpaid hours than those in permanent positions. This outcome appears to
be robust for each quarter estimate. Other results show that the propensity
for doing unpaid work hours increases with age, is more widespread in the
north east of the country than in the south, varies signicantly across sectors
and occupations and is higher for those who are in executive or managerial
positions or whose job involves coordination duties. A surprising result is that
propensity for doing unpaid work hours seems to be widespread in the public
sector. Broadly speaking, we can say that overtime work does not seem to be
more in
uenced by the type of occupation than the familial status of the worker.
In contrast to previous results, the absence indicator (table 3) is signicant:
the negative coecient shows that individuals in temporary work have a lower
absence probability than workers in permanent positions. The results suggest
that if the worker is on temporary contract the probability of being absent from
work is lower than a permanent worker, holding other variables at their mean.
The results are conrmed for all estimates presented. Other results show that
5the absence probability is higher for women, decreases with age and education
and is lower in the southern regions and for non-nationals. Also, the probability
of being absent from work varies across sectors and lowers for those who are
involved in coordination duties in their job. Moreover, it is clearly in
uenced
by the worker's marital status: those who are at the head of the family are
signicantly more likely to be absent from work than other member of the
family.
5 Estimation of the causal eect
As said above, worker eort is observed at time T2 upon the stock of individ-
uals entering in T1. The propensity score matching is based on pre treatment
characteristics of individuals referred at time T0 (age, geographical area, mari-
tal status, level of education, nationality, labor market status at T0, student or
not). Results (Table 4 and 5) show that matching generally reduces the dier-
ences between the eort of temporary and permanent workers. In the case of
overtime work, not surprisingly, the dierences are not signicant before match-
ing: this result conrms the result of the previous section. As far as absence,
dierences remain positive and signicant after matching only for women: in
other words, only women who work with a temporary contract show lower prob-
ability to be absent at work. This result seems consistent with the ndings of
Ichino and Ripahn (2004). Here estimates may be aected by a selection prob-
lem in the sense that the results may be biased if unobservable factors determine
the selection into temporary contracts and if these are correlated with eort.
As explained in section 2, Italy has a deeply segmented labor market and some
groups (e.g. young people) are over represented in temporary jobs. In such
a situation, being in a temporary position presumably re
ects being in a cer-
tain group of individuals. In other words, the probability of being a temporary
worker may be related to observable characteristics of the individual (such as
age, geographical area etc.), rather than unobservable factors like motivation
or ability. Secondly, the hypothesis is tested on a homogeneous sample: both
treatment and control groups are individuals seeking work at T0 and who nd
it (with a temporary or permanent contract) in the subsequent period. Thirdly,
treatment and control groups are matched on pre-treatment characteristics and
the set of covariates includes the labor market status at T0 which can be con-
sidered a rough indicator of the labor market histories of individuals that may
account for unobservable factors.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this study is to examine the determinants of worker eort and to
investigate the incentive role played by dierent contractual arrangements. The
hypothesis to be tested is that the probability of exerting eort is higher for
temporary workers than for permanent employees, using as indicators unpaid
6overtime hours and absenteeism. The causal eect of the type of contract and
worker eort is investigated by using the propensity score matching technique.
Data are taken from Italian Labor Force Survey. The results show that tem-
porary workers provide more eort only with regard to absence but not with
regard to unpaid overtime work. In the case of absence, dierences between
eort of temporary and permanent workers is positive and signicant only for
women.
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Entry Level Certicate (Elementary School Graduate) 18.9
Lower Level Certi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9Table 2: Logit estimates of unpaid overtime work (Year 2007)
I quart II quart III quart IV quart
Woman -0.310*** 0.113 -0.301*** -0.179*
(0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.02)
Entry level certicate -0.668*** -0.415 -0.607*** -0.474***
(0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)
Lower level certicate -0.213* -0.569*** -0.132 -0.244**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00)
Upper secondary level cert. -0.018 -0.302** -0.027 -0.100
(0.81) (0.00) (0.74) (0.15)
North east 0.249*** 0.189* 0.260*** 0.107*
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03)
Centre 0.022 0.138 0.017 -0.115*
(0.71) (0.20) (0.79) (0.04)
Islands -0.892*** -0.696*** -0.546*** -0.718***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
South -0.887*** -0.357** -0.749*** -0.844***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Temporary Job -0.106 -0.185 0.019 -0.091
(0.18) (0.20) (0.79) (0.21)
Part Time Job -0.280*** -0.834*** -0.047 -0.192**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.01)
Agriculture -0.356 -0.097 0.257 -0.221
(0.10) (0.80) (0.15) (0.23)
Energy industry 0.482** -0.130 0.845*** 0.136
(0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.45)
Transports (industry) 0.470*** -0.008 0.564*** 0.356***
(0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00)
Construction 0.256* -0.245 0.343** -0.059
(0.02) (0.33) (0.00) (0.59)
Trade 0.210* 0.247 0.507*** 0.351***
(0.02) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotels and restaurants 0.152 0.734*** 0.446*** 0.094
(0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48)
Transports (services) 0.517*** 0.321 0.747*** 0.512***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Banking and real estate 0.360** 0.428** 0.674*** 0.377**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Services for rms 0.390*** 0.017 0.651*** 0.359***
(0.00) (0.91) (0.00) (0.00)
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
(references: sex: male, education: degree, geographical area: north west, con-
tract: permanent, full time, sector education and health, occupation: elemen-
tary occupation, family position: son, nationality: nationals job position blue
collar, family status: single rm's size big).
10Table 2: Logit estimates of unpaid overtime work (Year 2007)
I quart II quart III quart IV quart
Government Public Administration 0.421*** -0.174 0.559*** 0.352***
(0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00)
Other Services -0.022 0.091 0.522*** -0.009
(0.87) (0.64) (0.00) (0.94)
Company directors -0.063 -0.395 -0.489 -0.078
(0.79) (0.19) (0.08) (0.75)
Scientists 0.294* 0.285 0.078 0.162
(0.04) (0.25) (0.61) (0.22)
Technicians 0.337** 0.200 0.309** 0.202
(0.00) (0.38) (0.01) (0.05)
Clerks 0.282* -0.119 0.430*** 0.207
(0.01) (0.62) (0.00) (0.05)
Services and sales workers 0.437*** -0.003 0.613*** 0.385***
(0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00)
Farmers and skilled workers 0.367*** -0.363 0.442*** 0.311**
(0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
Craft and related 0.274* -0.701* 0.353*** 0.176
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08)
Second job 0.567** -0.033 -0.320 -0.075
(0.01) (0.93) (0.27) (0.74)
Head of family 0.295* 0.485* 0.368** 0.078
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.47)
Single 0.355*** 0.529** 0.467*** 0.183*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Spouse 0.671*** 0.838*** 0.825*** 0.588***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non national (EU) -0.180 -0.332 -0.414* -0.247
(0.35) (0.47) (0.04) (0.12)
Non National (non EU) -0.306* 0.072 -0.227* -0.338***
(0.01) (0.79) (0.02) (0.00)
White collar (executive manager) -0.654*** 1.540*** -0.592** -1.148***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
White collar (senior manager) -0.515*** 1.153*** -0.537*** -0.685***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
White collar (employee) -0.112 0.549*** -0.214** -0.054
(0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42)
Other position -0.113 1.039** -0.005 -0.066
(0.57) (0.00) (0.98) (0.72)
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
(references: sex: male, education: degree, geographical area: north west, con-
tract: permanent, full time, sector education and health, occupation: elemen-
tary occupation, family position: son, nationality: nationals job position blue
collar, family status: single rm's size big).
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I quart II quart III quart IV quart
Married -0.082 -0.347* -0.248** -0.021
(0.35) (0.02) (0.00) (0.79)
Separated/divorced/widower 0.177 0.046 -0.078 0.313***
(0.07) (0.78) (0.44) (0.00)
small rm -0.261*** 0.124 -0.445*** -0.280***
(0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)
No Coordination activity -0.530*** -0.448*** -0.570*** -0.679***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No position -0.334 -0.268 -0.939*
(0.74) (0.54) (0.04)
Age 0.049** 0.093** 0.052** 0.043*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Age sq. -0.081*** -0.118** -0.088*** -0.078***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure -0.001 -0.014 -0.011 -0.002
(0.93) (0.31) (0.15) (0.75)
Tenure3 -0.000 0.042 0.025 0.015
(1.00) (0.31) (0.32) (0.51)
Constant -3.268*** -5.896*** -3.431*** -2.617***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PseudoR2 0.0678 0.0956 0.0660 0.0621
Number of obs. 43819 43545 42481 42746
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
(references: sex: male, education: degree, geographical area: north west, con-
tract: permanent, full time, sector education and health, occupation: elemen-
tary occupation, family position: son, nationality: nationals job position blue
collar, family status: single rm's size big).
12Table 3: Logit estimates of absence choice (Year 2007)
I quart II quart III quart IV quart
Woman 0.260** 0.182 0.086 0.209*
(0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02)
Entry level certicate -0.066 0.066 -0.230** -0.086
(0.60) (0.64) (0.00) (0.48)
Lower level certicate -0.198* -0.132 -0.213*** -0.196*
(0.04) (0.19) (0.00) (0.03)
Upper secondary level cert. -0.112 -0.097 -0.135** -0.115
(0.16) (0.25) (0.00) (0.12)
North East 0.100 0.069 -0.089* 0.061
(0.08) (0.27) (0.01) (0.28)
Centre 0.013 0.040 0.030 0.003
(0.84) (0.58) (0.44) (0.96)
Islands -0.327*** -0.347*** -0.223*** 0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87)
South -0.255*** -0.233** -0.101** -0.114
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07)
Temporary job -0.231** -0.468*** -0.217*** -0.147*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Part Time Job -0.007 0.033 -0.050 -0.132*
(0.91) (0.64) (0.22) (0.04)
Agriculture 0.094 0.053 -0.979*** -0.003
(0.53) (0.75) (0.00) (0.98)
Energy industry 0.271 0.099 -0.945*** 0.027
(0.17) (0.67) (0.00) (0.89)
Transport (industry) -0.001 -0.287*** -0.423*** 0.153*
(0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Construction 0.160 -0.595*** -0.624*** 0.149
(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17)
Trade -0.178 -0.169 -0.619*** -0.248**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01)
Hotels and Restaurants -0.190 -0.537*** -0.828*** -0.053
(0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70)
Transports (services) -0.425*** -0.244 -0.782*** -0.122
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.26)
Banking and Real Estate -0.239 0.074 -0.796*** -0.388**
(0.09) (0.59) (0.00) (0.01)
Services for rms -0.229* -0.335** -0.641*** -0.267**
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
(references: sex: male, education: degree, geographical area: north west, con-
tract: permanent, full time, sector education and health, occupation: elemen-
tary occupation, family position: son, nationality: nationals job position blue
collar, family status: single rm's size big).
13Table 3: Logit estimates of absence choice (Year 2007)
I quart II quart III quart IV quart
Government Public Administration 0.016 0.226* -0.664*** -0.179
(0.86) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05)
Other Services -0.262* -0.249 -0.814*** -0.368**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
Company directors -0.385 -0.563 0.249 -0.086
(0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.72)
Scientists -0.053 -0.130 0.178* -0.081
(0.70) (0.37) (0.02) (0.55)
Technicians -0.179 -0.131 -0.101 -0.077
(0.10) (0.23) (0.11) (0.46)
Clerks -0.220 -0.084 -0.187** -0.060
(0.06) (0.46) (0.01) (0.58)
Services and sales workers 0.037 -0.053 -0.370*** -0.146
(0.71) (0.61) (0.00) (0.15)
Farmers and skilled workers 0.089 0.137 0.070 0.057
(0.35) (0.19) (0.22) (0.53)
Crafts and related 0.203* 0.271* 0.125* 0.190
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Head of the family 0.979*** 1.289*** 0.342*** 0.837***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Single 0.714*** 0.776*** 0.064 0.481***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00)
Spouse 0.521*** 0.690*** 0.005 0.338**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.94) (0.00)
Non National (EU) -0.272 -0.091 -0.116 -0.616**
(0.19) (0.70) (0.33) (0.00)
Non National (non EU) 0.022 -0.428** -0.397*** -0.531***
(0.85) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
White Collar (Executive Manager) 0.006 -0.258 -0.278* -0.228
(0.98) (0.26) (0.02) (0.25)
White Collar (Senior Manager) 0.028 -0.335* 0.258*** -0.114
(0.83) (0.02) (0.00) (0.35)
White Collar (Employee) -0.080 -0.103 0.216*** -0.074
(0.32) (0.21) (0.00) (0.34)
Other Position -0.405 -0.331 0.097 -0.668**
(0.07) (0.24) (0.43) (0.01)
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
(references: sex: male, education: degree, geographical area: north west, con-
tract: permanent, full time, sector education and health, occupation: elemen-
tary occupation, family position: son, nationality: nationals job position blue
collar, family status: single rm's size big).
14Table 3: Logit estimates of absence choice (Year 2007)
I quart II quart III quart IV quart
Married 0.157 -0.013 0.185** 0.144
(0.10) (0.89) (0.00) (0.12)
Separated/divorced/widower -0.105 -0.038 0.014 -0.068
(0.33) (0.73) (0.82) (0.50)
Small rm -0.179** -0.430*** 0.009 -0.277***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.79) (0.00)
No coordination Activity 0.214*** -0.003 0.125*** -0.092
(0.00) (0.97) (0.00) (0.10)
No position 0.891* -0.265 0.230 -0.599
(0.04) (0.66) (0.39) (0.24)
Age -0.097*** -0.087*** -0.012 -0.068***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.00)
Age sq. 0.090*** 0.074** 0.011 0.064**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00)
Tenure 0.027*** 0.017 0.015*** 0.009
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.21)
Tenure3 -0.051* -0.025 -0.018 -0.008
(0.03) (0.34) (0.20) (0.72)
Constant -1.334*** -1.322** -0.991*** -1.394***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudor2 0.0309 0.0409 0.0505 0.0280
Number of obs. 44221 44430 42848 43160
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
(references: sex: male, education: degree, geographical area: north west, con-
tract: permanent, full time, sector education and health, occupation: elemen-
tary occupation, family position: son, nationality: nationals job position blue
collar, family status: single rm's size big).
15Table 4: Unpaid Overtime work: Estimates of the causal eects (2006-2007)
Men Temporary Permanent Dierence S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 0.0552 0.0470 0.008 0.014 0.58
ATT Matched 0.0553 0.0954 -0.040 0.024 -1.67
Women
Unmatched 0.0399 0.05 0.002 0.011 -1.02
ATT Matched 0.0401 0.0547 -0.011 0.025 -0.90
Table 5: Absence at work: Estimates of the causal eects (2006-2007)
Men Temp. Perm. Dierence S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 0.0318 0.0901 0.008 0.015 -3.91
ATT Matched 0.0319 0.0954 -0.040 0.025 -1.63
Women
Unmatched 0.0447 0.1168 0.072 0.014 -4.98
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